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Derridean Diagnosis of Marketplace Ills: Curing 
Schizophrenia and Amnesia in the First Amendment 
Search for Truth 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Among the arguments offered in support of protecting freedom 
of speech, the truth-based rationale has reigned supreme.1 This 
rationale, which has the discovery of truth as its ultimate aim, 
proposes two guidelines: (1) that no government is in a position to 
make speech regulations because it is not, at present, able to 
distinguish a true idea from a false idea, and (2) that when ideas are 
given free rein to compete with each other in the marketplace, the 
truth will eventually emerge victorious. In other words, the rationale 
defers judgments about truth on the premise that the market will 
inevitably reveal what the truth is. The truth-based rationale is thus 
an ends-focused theory—one that justifies itself by the end it 
promises. Along the way, a host of offensive speech—racism, hate, 
and obscenity—is permitted because the truth is worth the cost (and 
the cost is the unrestrained competition of ideas, some of which will 
be offensive). Undoubtedly this rationale has been highly influential 
in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.2 And, 
 
 1. John M. Kang, Deliberating the Divine, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007) (“The 
justification from truth represents the most prominent basis of legal support for the right of 
free speech.”); William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment 
Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (noting that the rationale is “the most influential 
argument supporting . . . [free] speech” and that the idea that a “marketplace of ideas that 
allows truth to ultimately prevail over falsity has been virtually canonized”). 
 2. See Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 755–56 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (citing Red Lion’s truth rationale with approval); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. 
Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 n.3 (2005) (citing Holmes’s dissent in Abrams with approval); 
Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (same); FCC v. League of Women 
Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984) (same); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–04 (1983) (“The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom to 
speak one's mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—but 
also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.”); Red 
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First 
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail . . . .”); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition 
of the market . . . .”).  
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boasting the support of such thinkers as John Milton,3 John Stuart 
Mill,4 and Oliver Wendell Holmes,5 the rationale is certainly hard to 
gainsay within the broader Western tradition.  
Despite the popularity of the approach, however, this Comment 
posits that the truth-based rationale is inherently flawed. The 
rationale pushes truth away into the future based on a skepticism 
about man’s ability to make accurate judgments, and it invites truth 
into the present based on the premise that it is only a matter of time 
until, in the battle of ideas, truth emerges victorious. This creates a 
kind of schizophrenia in the First Amendment—commanding 
deferral while encouraging action. As a result, the market either 
produces truth in the present that is not truth at all, or it banishes 
truth to a future that will never come. To ease the tension between 
these conflicting dictates of a truth-based approach, this Comment 
suggests that the marketplace theory should be recast to highlight 
the value of its means rather than the ends it may produce. 
The deferral principle requires that judgment be withheld in the 
present. Because the premise is based on a skeptical view of human 
ability to discover objective truth, truth cannot come until humans 
change radically. Thus the rationale commands deferral of truth-
judgments to an incalculable future—a future dependent on an 
exponential increase in human rationality, the coming of a Messiah, 
or some other transcendental event that would endow humans with 
the ability to recognize truth objectively. But if such an event 
occurred, it would change the nature of human existence and the 
need for law. In sum, the truth-based rationale suggests postponing 
speech regulation until a time when that regulation would no longer 
even be necessary. But in this human world as we know it—the time 
and place where speech regulation is required—the truth would 
never be available. Reduced to this useless state, the principle of 
infinite deferral has produced no shortage of critics.6 “No amount of 
 
 3. See JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (John W. Hales ed., Oxford Press 1898) (1644). 
 4. See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND THE SUBJECTION OF 
WOMEN 1 (Henry Holt & Co. 1882) (1859). 
 5. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); 
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);. 
 6. E.g., Stanley Fish, Fraught With Death: Skepticism, Progressivism, and the First 
Amendment, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1061 (1993); Richard M. Thomas, Milton and Mass 
Culture: Toward a Postmodernist Theory of Tolerance, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 525, 544 (1991) 
(noting postmodernism’s denial of “the stability of meaning and the discoverability of an 
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waiting will get us any closer to the truth” is the basic premise of 
these critics, and, in the meantime, people are suffering real harm—
subjected to hateful, obscene, or racist speech—in the name of a 
“bodiless hope.”7 The supposedly temporary unpleasantness of the 
path to truth is, it seems, a permanent state of affairs. 
On the other hand, the premise of inevitable revelation poses its 
own set of problems. The truth is required now—in the present, 
where people need guidance. Thus, the second guiding principle of 
the truth-based approach promises and even produces “truth” in the 
present.8 But this movement from deferral to revelation involves a 
moment of amnesia. It is not possible without a willful forgetting of 
the premise undergirding the deferral principle—that truth is not 
available except in the future that never comes. The arrival of truth 
in the present is thus cause for alarm among some scholars and jurists 
who are suspicious of what “truths” may come and what freedoms 
they might end when deferral is forgotten.9 The marketplace, after 
all, allowed Nazi propaganda to compete and ultimately crowned its 
terrible premises as truth—as the ideas that subdued all others in a 
competition that was supposed to produce truth. When the market 
does establish a truth about a given topic, the acceptance and 
sanctification of that idea as truth would theoretically destroy a 
person’s freedom to throw the opposite idea into the ring for 
 
ultimate foundation for truth”). 
 7. Fish, supra note 6, at 1065.  
 8. E.g., MILL, supra note 4, at 70 (proposing that after a period of testing through 
debate, humans can have a “rational assurance” that an idea is true). 
 9. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1945). In an oft quoted 
passage from Barnette, which considered compulsory flag salutes in elementary schools, Justice 
Jackson warned of the dangers of governments buying into, and enforcing, the “truth” of 
nationalism: 
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end thought 
essential to their time and country have been waged by many good as well as by evil 
men . . . . As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes 
more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper division of our people 
could proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what 
doctrine and whose program public education officials shall compel youth to unite 
in embracing . . . . Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find 
themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves 
only the unanimity of the graveyard. 
Id. at 640–41. See also Marshall, supra note 1, at 22 (“Arguably, humanity is free precisely 
because truth is not known. . . . Truth, on the other hand, presumably binds humanity to its 
precepts.”). 
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competition. Usually, this freedom is stripped away by the use or 
threat of physical force, although as a purely metaphysical matter, the 
discovery of an absolute truth would quickly put to death all ideas 
opposing it without any outside aid.10 This potential loss of freedom, 
which this Comment will refer to as “market-topical violence,” is 
based on a “truth” that is unauthorized by the truth-based 
rationale’s own dictates and thus weakens the viability of the 
rationale.  
Another perhaps deeper concern about the potential of present 
truth is what this Comment will label “market-concept violence”—
violence against the free speech market itself. Indeed, some have 
argued that a potential outcome of a marketplace that purports to 
reveal truth could be the death of the marketplace itself.11 While 
market-topic violence might preclude anti-nationalistic speech, in a 
society that still accepts free speech as a concept generally, one would 
still presumably be free to release other ideas into the marketplace 
about art, religion, science, etc., without restriction. But if the idea 
of free speech itself competed and lost in the market, one would no 
longer be free to engage in debate in all cases. What one could say 
would be a product not of what one thought but rather of what the 
power structure permitted.12 The marketplace may, it seems, be 
susceptible to suicidal tendencies. 
Due to these inherent tensions, the truth-based rationale finds 
itself in a schizophrenic dilemma. On the one hand, if the 
government waits until the millennial day when humans reach 
universal consensus on what is truth, or a god comes to lead us to it 
(the functional equivalent of forever), the ends-based rationale will 
never actually produce an end when it is needed. In the meantime, 
people will suffer from the means—harmful speech—that the ends 
supposedly justify. On the other hand, when the market forgets its 
 
 10. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640–41.  
 11. E.g., Fish, supra note 6, at 1076–77 (“[L]iberal democracy enforces no orthodoxies, 
not even orthodoxies constitutive of its deepest aspirations. The maintenance and flourishing 
of those aspirations are left to the blind workings of history which, of course, may have other 
eventualities ‘in mind,’ including the emergence of dictatorship. As McGowan and Tangri put 
it with admirable candor, the marketplace theory ‘provides no way to defend against a 
population that willingly adopts objectively destructive and repugnant beliefs, and would 
prohibit the government from regulating against them.’”) (quoting David F. McGowan & 
Ragesh K. Tangri, Comment, A Libertarian Critique of University Restrictions of Offensive Free 
Speech, 79 CAL. L. REV. 825, 837 (1991)). 
 12. Id. 
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own deferral principle and does produce “truth” in the present, it is 
illegitimate. As a result, freedom to speak shrinks one topic at a time, 
or, at the extreme, disappears altogether. Were such an occurrence 
based on actual truth, then presumably this outcome would be 
acceptable. After all, if there was such a thing as objective falsity, 
society should be happy to be rid of it. But because cutting short the 
deferral principle and letting truth into the present guarantees the 
illegitimacy of whatever “truths” are accepted, the potential violence 
towards freedom is unacceptable. 
This Comment seeks to extricate the marketplace of ideas, or 
something like it, from this morass. The solution begins with a 
recognition that present dissatisfaction with the theory springs from 
the focus on what ends the marketplace can produce rather than 
what means it offers. Instead, using Jacques Derrida’s famous essay 
Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” this Comment 
will argue that truth is procedural—that the market works because it 
facilitates an interrogatory process that deconstructs, rather than 
constructs, truth.13 The following three premises from Derrida will 
 
 13. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”, in 
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 3 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992). 
Derrida often vehemently declined opportunities to define Deconstruction, or even to label his 
theory so. Among his acolytes and critics, definitions vary and are sometimes the source of 
bitter dispute. For purposes of this Comment, however, to deconstruct means to expose the 
unfounded, or unauthorized, nature of the power to privilege one idea over another—here the 
power to name one thing true and another untrue. In his book Literary Theory, Terry Eagleton 
notes that this power to create a pecking order tries to authorize itself by resting on “first 
principles”—ideas that are purportedly the origin of all other ideas, and thus unassailable: 
“Freedom, the Family, Democracy, Independence, Authority, Order and so on.” Because 
Freedom, for example, is a first principle, one is always authorized to make decisions that 
privilege freedom over unfreedom. TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY 131 (1983). 
Eagleton understands Derrida’s contribution (sometimes called deconstruction, sometimes 
simply categorized as a kind of post structuralism) as an argument that there are no 
unassailable first principles—that the apparent “truth” of freedom as a principle has nothing to 
do with any fixed quality of the universe or existence, but is instead merely an idea that was 
“elevated by social ideologies to a privileged position.” Id. at 131–32. Thus, this Comment 
focuses on the government’s power to privilege one idea over another in the free speech 
marketplace. Ultimately, the deconstructive approach will conclude that such power is 
illegitimate, and any law that rests on it is unauthorized. But, as Eagleton notes, the point of 
deconstruction is not simply to “deny the existence of relatively determinate truths, meanings, 
identities [and] intentions” for its own sake. Id. at 148. Deconstruction should not be used to 
deny the possibility of justice and leave nothing in its place, but rather to interrogate the power 
to call things just or true in the hope of producing more justice, not less. Derrida, supra, at 20. 
Deconstruction is an attitude and a process that relentlessly attacks the simulacrum of justice. 
It never rests, and in its movement (rather than its conclusion) it produces justice.  
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be instrumental: (1) that laws are a violent impersonation of justice 
because, if traced back far enough, they are always marked by an 
original violence for which there was no justification;14 (2) that 
although no present decision could ever be said to be “just,” the 
demand for just decisions is always immediate;15 and (3) the justice 
human beings can “do” is to interrogate and deconstruct the 
supposed grounds for what is currently passing for justice, all in the 
name of, or in pursuit of, more justice.16  
In free speech terms, the market will never identify objectively 
true or false ideas, so the market’s conclusions cannot be relied upon 
to provide the grounds for “just” speech regulations. But since the 
demand for decisions to be made about speech regulation is always 
immediate, and cannot wait until the “truth” of such decisions works 
itself clear, governments must always proceed unjustly, making 
unjustified, “violent” decisions—that is, decisions made to forbid A 
and permit B at the cost of the equally well-founded (which is to say 
equally unfounded) argument that B should be forbidden and A 
permitted.17 The justice a government can do, however, is to secure 
the rights of citizens to challenge the supposedly just grounds for 
whatever speech regulations the government makes by disclaiming 
“truth” altogether. In this way, free speech as a concept cannot be 
foreclosed, though its outcomes could be (must be) ceaselessly 
challenged.  
 
  It should also be noted that for Derrida, justice and truth are equivalents—both are 
stand-ins for a metaphysical impossibility, an unassailable ground. A “true” speech regulation, 
one that protects truth and disavows falsity, would be a just regulation. To pursue truth is to 
pursue justice, and vice versa. Thus this Comment will use the terms interchangeably. 
 14. Derrida, supra note 13, at 14. Derrida gives as an example the “founding of nation 
states or the institutive act of a constitution.” A constitution is often seen as an original 
principle, a center on which all authority can rest moving forward. But the constitution itself is 
authorized by illegitimate violence—both metaphysical and physical. The violence comes in the 
form of the elevation of one principle at the cost of another without any authorization for 
doing so. While one principle may seem more desirable to the minds of those writing a 
constitution, this semblance of superiority is contextual, not universal. And the power to make 
those decisions did not come from any authorized source—it was taken by violence against the 
British government (though, if traced far enough, one would never actually find authority to 
make such decisions that was not taken by violence). See infra note 110 and accompanying 
text. 
 15. Derrida, supra note 13, at 26. 
 16. Id. at 20–21. 
 17. Id. at 14 (noting that decisions to authorize one action over another are always a 
“violence without a ground”). 
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Recasting marketplace theory to focus on means rather than ends 
will thus relieve some of the anxiety that the truth-based approach 
has engendered. It will justify speech regulation now, in response to 
the immediate demand for it, without any pretense of being based 
on truth. At the same time, this approach would also ease fears about 
truth swallowing free speech because the deconstructive process that 
free speech facilitates is the only “truth” of which we can be sure.  
In the discussion that follows, Part II explores the truth-based 
approaches to free speech articulated in the works of Milton, Mill, 
and Holmes, with the goal of spotlighting the principles of deferred 
and present truth in each. Part III surveys in more detail the 
criticisms of the ends-based approach. Part IV explores Derrida’s 
theory of justice, translating it into a means-based rationale for free 
speech and showing how such a rationale addresses some of the 
issues raised by an ends-based approach. Part V provides a brief 
conclusion.  
II. MILTON, MILL, AND HOLMES 
In order to flesh out the particulars of the ends-based approach, 
this Part will examine the seminal works of “marketplace” free-
speech theory: Milton’s Areopagitica, Mill’s On Liberty, and Justice 
Holmes’s dissents in Abrams and Gitlow. Though these thinkers are 
undoubtedly distinguishable, this Part will focus on the two baseline 
premises that make them similar: deferral and inevitable revelation. 
A. Milton’s Areopagitica 
Published in 1643, Milton’s ends-based Areopagitica stands as, if 
not the first, surely the most referenced work opposing government 
suppression of speech. Written in response to a licensing law passed 
by Parliament in the early days of the English Civil War, the tract 
systematically argues against publication licensing schemes.18 In his 
introduction to the tract, Milton explains: 
I wrote my “Areopagitica” . . . in order to deliver the press from 
the restraints with which it was encumbered; that the power of 
determining what was true and what was false, what ought to be 
 
 18. MILTON, supra note 3, at 4–5.  For a succinct account of Areopagitica’s historical 
context, see Vincent Blasi, John Milton’s Areopagitica and the Modern First Amendment, 
COMM. LAW., Winter 1996, at 1, 12–14. 
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published and what to be suppressed, might no longer be entrusted 
to a few illiterate and illiberal individuals, who refused their 
sanction to any work which contained views or sentiments at all 
above the level of the vulgar superstition.19  
Rather than regulation, Milton proposed the competition of ideas in 
a free “market” as the best means of finding truth.20 He proclaims,  
And though all the windes of doctrin were let loose to play upon 
the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licencing 
and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood 
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors in a free and open 
encounter.21  
The contest itself, rather than a few “illiberal and illiterate” 
government officials, would determine what was true and false. And 
until the contest yielded a victor, regulation of speech must be 
deferred: “if all cannot be of one mind . . . . this doubtles is more 
wholsome, more prudent, and more Christian: that many be 
tolerated rather than all compell’d.”22 
But at the same time, the possibility of truth’s revelation is never 
in doubt for Milton. He asks, “For who knows not that Truth is 
strong next to the Almighty? She needs no policies, no strategems, 
nor licencings to make her victorious.”23 Thus, after a period of 
wrestling, truth will inevitably reveal itself. Milton is slightly different 
from the other thinkers this Part examines because his faith in the 
revelation of truth is overtly theological. He proposes that human 
beings will not discover all truth “till her Masters second 
comming.”24 But the supernatural underpinnings of his ends-based 
theory do nothing to dilute its ultimate effect.25  
B. Mill’s On Liberty 
First published in 1859, the second chapter of John Stuart Mill’s 
On Liberty, entitled Of Liberty of Thought and Discussion, continues 
 
 19. MILTON, supra note 3, at vii. 
 20. Id. at 52. 
 21. Id. at 51–52 (spelling in original). 
 22. Id. at 54 (spelling and capitalization in original). 
 23. Id. at 52 (spelling in original). 
 24. Id. at 43 (spelling in original). 
 25.  See infra Part III. 
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in the ends-based tradition of Areopagitica. Clearly on similar 
footing with Milton in his disapproval of censorship, Mill sees the 
evil of government prohibitions on speech as twofold: 
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that 
it is robbing the human race . . . . If the opinion is right, they are 
deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, 
they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception 
and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with 
error.26 
Thus, with the danger of either suppressing truth or weakening our 
hold on it always present in speech regulations, government 
regulation of speech is an “evil” to be avoided.27 These dangers are 
inherent in a political world where man is fallible.28 To shape one’s 
idea of what is correct into law, to the exclusion of other ideas, is 
ignoring man’s fallibility—it is to “decide the question for all 
mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of 
judging.”29 Thus, until that fallibility is remedied, and men no longer 
need debate to find truth, regulation must be deferred. But is there 
ever a time when decisions (or laws) about speech can be made 
legitimately (i.e., when the truth will be revealed)? 
Anticipating this question, Mill imagines a debate with an 
interlocutor who asserts, “[m]en and governments must act to the 
best of their ability,” and have to “assume [their] opinion be true for 
the guidance of [their] own conduct.”30 Mill rejoins “there is the 
greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, 
because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been 
refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its 
refutation.”31 Thus, while individuals must hold off on making 
conclusions due to their fallibility (deferral), through debate and 
contradiction individuals can arrive at truth (inevitable revelation). 
Mill cautions that “on no other terms can a being with human 
 
 26. MILL, supra note 4, at 35. 
 27. Id. at 60. The advantage of having multiple opinions will continue until men “have 
entered a stage of intellectual advancement which at present seems at an incalculable distance.” 
Id. at 83. 
 28. Id. at 36. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 39. 
 31. Id. 
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faculties have any rational assurance of being right,”32 implying of 
course that human beings can have rational assurances of being right 
in the present. After ideas have bounced around long enough in the 
marketplace, and they have manifested themselves so persuasively 
that men have given up refuting them, presumably they could then 
be instituted into law. Here, like Milton, Mill evinces a firm belief in 
the possibility of truth’s revelation, though it will come through a 
rational rather than spiritual millennium.  
C. Holmes: Abrams 
Justice Holmes enters the fray with a seemingly wholehearted 
acceptance of an ends-based approach, as demonstrated in one of his 
most famous dissenting opinions—Abrams v. United States. The case 
involved the prosecution of Jacob Abrams and others for violation of 
the Espionage Act based on their publication of various political 
tracts that encouraged both violent and peaceful resistance to the 
American war effort.33 A majority of the Court upheld the 
conviction,34 but Justice Holmes dissented. His theory is expressed 
in a few short lines: 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly 
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and 
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your 
wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. . . . But when men 
have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may 
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations 
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better 
reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their 
wishes safely can be carried out.35  
Within this reasoning Holmes implicitly makes deferral arguments—
that government is not now prepared to make any permanent 
decisions about the content of truth, given the understanding that 
many “fighting faiths” have been discredited. And once human 
 
 32. Id.  
 33. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919). 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
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beings accept that “fighting faiths” have been discredited, the 
necessary corollary is that whatever faith they are fighting for could 
just as well be overturned.  
At the same time, Holmes offers a mystic, perhaps under-
theorized conclusion to deferral—the acceptance of the market.36 
Holmes’s advice, to those who hope to “express [their] wishes in 
law,”37 is to let their wishes compete in the market and “get 
accepted.” When that occurs, an idea can be classified as “true,” and 
this is the “only ground upon which their wishes . . . can be carried 
out.”38 In other words, only then can the truth be expressed in law.  
In summary then, these three major thinkers are in substantial 
agreement on both the inevitable revelation of truth and the 
necessity of maintaining an infinite free interchange of ideas. 
Emphasizing the similarity between these three, I synthesize their 
ideas into the following two principles: (1) deferral, or the idea that 
speech regulation must be deferred because we do not yet know 
which ideas are true, and (2) inevitable revelation, or the idea that 
competition in the market will ultimately reveal truth and provide us 
with the grounds for devising regulations. These principles form the 
core premises of the quintessential ends-based approach to free 
speech.  
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE ENDS-BASED APPROACH 
The essential difficulty with the premises of the ends-based 
approach is that, when the premises are entertained at the same time, 
they produce a schizophrenic First Amendment framework—one 
that commands deferral while simultaneously encouraging action. 
The deferral premise always requires waiting, as will be demonstrated 
in the work of Milton, Mill, and Holmes, until an impossible 
moment arrives, that is, a moment that could not arrive without a 
massive shift in human epistemology—one that would completely 
alter the relationship between human beings and laws. But the whole 
purpose of waiting for truth to arise from the market is to help 
society make proper laws to guide us in the present, not to give us 
laws during a time when, ostensibly, we would not need them, or at 
 
 36. Fish, supra note 6, at 1072. Fish notes that the process Holmes describes “bears an 
uncanny relationship to what writers of pagan epic called ‘fate.’” Id. 
 37.  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 38.  Id. 
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least not need them in the same way. Thus, the same theory that 
assumes truth is only possible in the future simultaneously 
deconstructs into, and becomes infected with, the possibility of 
truth’s present manifestation. That manifestation always brings with 
it a moment of “amnesiac violence”—violent because it calls for a 
premature truth, one that is not authorized, and amnesiac because it 
proceeds in a conscious forgetting of the dictates of the deferral 
principle. The schizophrenic tension between these two principles is 
readily visible, for example, when one compares the deferral principle 
expressed by Justice Powell with Justice White’s emphasis on the 
revelation of truth. Justice Powell declares that ‘‘[u]nder the First 
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea”39 (and thus 
regulation must be deferred until some future where ideas can be 
found), while Justice White insists that “the purpose of the First 
Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in 
which truth will ultimately prevail”40 (and thus the truth can come 
into the present).  
A. Problems with Deferral: Truth is Always on the Horizon, Never in 
the Boat 
In order to understand the various failings of deferred truth, it is 
important to get a clear sense of why the truth-based theory 
demands deferral. Each of the thinkers considered in Part II 
identified a “transcendental” stopping point for the work of a 
tolerant marketplace. For Milton, tolerance in the marketplace 
sprung from a belief that Christ was the only arbiter of truth. Thus, 
recall that Milton believed that “[w]e have not yet found all 
[Truths] . . . nor ever shall doe, till her Master’s second coming.”41 
It hardly requires much space here to assert that such a time, were it 
to come, would be a game-changer—one that would completely 
reinvent man’s relationship to law and government. If there is a 
Christ, and he does come to man to reveal all truths, then one would 
think that any speech-regulation needs man has would evaporate. 
 
 39. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
 40. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); accord Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 
(1945); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 41. MILTON, supra note 3, at 43.  
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But in the present, where we “see through a glass, darkly”42 and so 
are in need of guidance, Milton’s truth is not available.43  
The transcendence of Mill is more concealed but still identifiable. 
The moment of truth for any particular idea would come when that 
idea had met every opportunity for contestation and had never been 
refuted.44 But how is one to decide whether an idea has met all 
opportunities for its contestation? How many people have to hear it? 
What about the possibility that a valid refutation exists, but nobody 
has proposed it yet? In short, without some fundamental change in 
human ability to attain objectivity, this formula for the end of 
deferral will never actually keep its promise. Mill himself, believing 
wholeheartedly in man’s fallibility, admits that this moment is at an 
“incalculable distance,”45 or, in other words, not an identifiable point 
on the current human trajectory.  
Finally, Holmes’s “acceptance of the market” theory fares no 
better. He presents no criteria for determining when such acceptance 
has taken place. Absent such criteria, the likelihood that the 
marketplace could “accept a truth” in a manner that simply garnered 
universal assent seems a distinctly un-human possibility. The specific 
problem is that if the market is just an amalgam of human opinion, 
then how does a collective opinion escape the implications of 
fallibilism any more than an individual one?46 Again, without a 
change in human nature, the market cannot produce the truth it 
promises. Such observations prompt Stanley Fish to observe that the 
 
 42. 1 Corinthians 13:12 (King James). 
 43. Thomas, supra note 6, at 545 (“[F]or Milton there is simply no human possibility—
prior to the Apocalypse—of defining the shape or essence of truth.”); see MILTON, supra note 
3, at 44 (“To be still searching what we know not by what we know, still closing up truth to 
truth as we find it . . . this is the golden rule . . . .”). Id. 
 44. MILL, supra note 4, at 41.  
 45. Id. at 83. 
 46. Stanley Fish asks:  
How would we know when the promised moment (a consummation devoutly to be 
wished) had arrived? Who would be authorized to mark it, since the persons living 
in some unnamed future would be no less partial in their visions than we are now? 
. . . [I]n the context of our militantly secular democratic (as opposed to theocratic) 
politics, there is no reason to believe that a future generation will have acquired the 
requisite unclouded vision.  
Fish, supra note 6, at 1072–73. 
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marketplace ideal “does not correspond to any form of social 
organization now extant.”47 
Whether the time period for waiting is capped by Jesus Christ, by 
a millennium of human rationality, or by the mystic acceptance of 
the market, each ends-based theory looks toward a moment that is 
not possible in the human world as we presently know it. Such a 
moment could not come without a total restructuring of the 
relationship between human beings and laws. In this sense, the 
moment of truth cannot have an identifiable locus along the current 
human trajectory. A moment of disruption, one that brings with it 
the possibility of human objectivity, must first occur. But in the 
postmodern world, where “objective or transcendent truth is 
nonsensical or, at best, unintelligible,”48 the command to defer until 
this moment is frivolous. Deferral is merely “sacrific[ing] the needs 
of men and women now suffering documentable harm to a bodiless 
hope.”49 Whatever truths might be produced in the impossible 
future are of no help in the present. Thus, running parallel with the 
command of infinite deferral is the inevitable pressure to make 
decisions for the now, rather than the “thin, abstract, and 
bloodless”50 future. This pressure works to produce a temptation—to 
forget the essential “future” nature of truth in favor of a present 
solution. And this forgetting brings its own set of dangers.  
B. Problems with Present Truth: If the Truth Got in the Boat, the Boat 
Would Sink 
The temptation towards present “truth” is problematic, and 
dangerous, because it brings with it the (1) possibility of violence in 
the guise of legitimacy and (2) an attendant death of freedom. First, 
as has been noted above, such a truth would be unfounded (violent) 
because it ignores, or forgets, the first principle of the ends-based 
rationale—that truth is only available in the (impossible) future. And 
this points to a larger theoretical problem: the inherent violence of 
any truth against freedom generally. When the market arrives at a 
“truth” for a given topic, a true ends-based rationale presumably 
 
 47. Id. at 1064. 
 48. Marshall, supra note 1, at 2. 
 49. Fish, supra note 6, at 1065. 
 50. Id. at 1070. 
DO NOT DELETE 10/15/2011 2:17 PM 
1293 Derridean Diagnosis of Marketplace Ills 
 1307 
could no longer permit opposing speech about that “truth”—at least 
not without qualifying it as already false, as in Mill’s model.51 In this 
manner, were we to accept a present truth model of the marketplace 
of ideas, an amnesiac violence would lead to an end of free speech on 
a topic upon which the market had, in a moment of forgetting, 
concluded. As has been noted by some scholars, one particularly 
nasty manifestation of such a process could be the end of free speech 
itself.52 The market could conclude that, whatever the truth about 
any other idea, one truth is that free speech in general should be shut 
down, placing the ends-based approach in the embarrassing position 
of entertaining suicidal tendencies.  
1. Present truth in Mill, Milton, and Holmes 
Moments of violent amnesia, or at least hints of such moments 
to come, are readily visible in Milton, Mill, and Holmes. In Milton, 
there is the telling use of “all” rather than “any” in his primary 
declaration of deferral: “We have not yet found all [Truths] . . . nor 
ever shall doe, till her Master’s second coming.”53 Indeed, Milton is 
not willing to wait until Christ comes to divide the conceptual sheep 
from the goats. He argues, in a line that contrasts sharply with the 
apparently abundant tolerance of his text, “Popery and open 
superstition” and “that also which is impious or evil absolutely either 
against faith or maners no law can possibly permit, that intends not 
to unlaw it self.”54 Some things, he suggests, simply have no right to 
compete in the marketplace anymore—some things we know are false 
now. And no one should underestimate the temptation to bring 
truth into the present just because Milton’s particular “truths”—
which exclude Catholicism, or an irreligious ideology, or “bad 
manners” from the marketplace—seem absurd.55 The contextual 
 
 51.  MILL, supra note 4, at 80. 
 52. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 53. MILTON, supra note 3, at 43. 
 54. Id. at 54. 
 55. Id. at 32. Richard Thomas, who sees Milton as a purveyor of postmodernism, has 
disputed an ends–based view of Areopagitica. Thomas, supra note 6, at 543. He asserts that 
Milton espouses a “negative definition of truth, entailing a constant progression and shifting of 
truth’s accepted shape.” Id. at 547. Although Thomas does not confront Milton’s anti-
Catholicism directly, presumably Thomas sees it simply as “distrust [of] any human discourse 
that strives toward universality.” Id. at 546. In other words, for Milton, the Catholic Church 
stood not as the wrong way to worship God, but as an obstacle to the free exchange of ideas. 
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nature of these assertions only spotlights the larger point that all 
“present” truths are formed by present context.  
Mill lays the groundwork for similar amnesiac moments, even if 
he does not engage in them himself. He supposes that as the great 
debate of ideas progresses and as “mankind improve[s], the number 
of doctrines which are no longer disputed or doubted will be 
constantly on the increase.”56 This improvement of mankind, 
presumably, would involve an increase in the general rationality of 
human beings, which, as it became more prevalent, would have a 
unifying effect on the human race. With this gradual unity of opinion 
would come the “cessation of serious controversy.”57 Although Mill 
would regret the loss of opportunity to sharpen truth against 
opposing ideas once controversies became settled, he holds out hope 
that “teachers of mankind [will] endeavor[] to provide a substitute 
for it” by simulating debate over settled ideas.58 From the possibility 
that this can happen springs the temptation to make it happen. 
Though Mill himself does not make declarations against any 
particular idea, one can imagine the ease with which human beings, 
infinitely willing to believe in their own rationality, could decide that 
an idea has undergone the appropriate amount of refutation.59  
Holmes demonstrates his willingness to accept “truth” in the 
present in his dissent in Gitlow v. New York, 60 written six years after 
Abrams. Benjamin Gitlow, business manager of The Revolutionary 
Age, the newspaper of the American Socialist Party, was indicted for 
criminal anarchy based on his publication of “The Left Wing 
 
Vincent Blasi rejects this idea, arguing that “Milton does claim that progressive revelation has 
shown some beliefs to be false, and they include the fundamental tenets of the Catholic 
religion.” Blasi, supra note 18, at 15–16.  
 56. MILL, supra note 4, at 80. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. This suggestion raises the question, “What does the ‘free’ in free speech mean?” 
If all it includes is the right of people to speak their ideas without government punishment, 
then Mill’s theory may not present any challenge to free speech. But how can speech be “free,” 
in any meaningful sense, if what one is speaking about is presumed false? “Arguably, humanity 
is free precisely because truth is not known.” Marshall, supra note 1, at 22.  
 59. One need only think, perhaps, of the infamous “I know it when I see it” standard 
proposed by Justice Stewart for determining what counted as pornographic speech to see 
exactly how inevitable such occurrences are. Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).  
 60. 268 U.S. 652 (1924). 
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Manifesto.”61 The manifesto advocated “general and militant” strikes 
among the working class as a means of affecting a proletarian 
revolution and the ouster of parliamentary state.62 Again the Court 
upheld the conviction, and again Holmes dissented.63 He explained, 
“If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship 
are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the 
community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be 
given their chance and have their way.”64 The possibility of such 
acceptance taking place not in some different time but in the present 
one, combined with the lack of criteria for discovering when 
acceptance actually occurs65 and a present need for guidance, could 
become a tool for exactly what it meant to prevent—suppression of 
ideas.66 
The temptations of present truth being ever present, their 
troubling consequences for free speech are twofold: (1) loss of 
freedom to speak about a particular topic (topical violence) and (2) 
loss of freedom to speak generally (conceptual violence). 
2. Market-topic violence: truth as the end of freedom to speak about a 
topic 
Though the full scope of this issue extends well beyond the 
bounds of this Comment, it is here sufficient to say that if truth finds 
its way into the present, it must come at a loss of freedom to speak 
about the subject of that truth, even if it does not come as the loss of 
freedom of speech generally. This is what Marshall has in mind when 
he proposes the following:  
Arguably, humanity is free precisely because truth is not known. It 
is only because of the absence of discernible divine or natural law 
that humanity is free to create its own rules of conduct. Truth, on 
 
 61. Id. at 654–56. 
 62. Id. at 656–59. 
 63.  Id. at 672. 
 64. Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 65. Considering the impossibility of this time ever coming during “human time,” 
Stanley Fish asks, “How would we know when the promised moment (a consummation 
devoutly to be wished) had arrived? Who would be authorized to mark it, since the persons 
living in some unnamed future would be no less partial in their visions than we are now?” Fish, 
supra note 6, at 1072. 
 66. Id. (arguing that the marketplace “could easily be seen as the abandonment of 
responsibility to impersonal, and perhaps terrible, forces”). 
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the other hand, presumably binds humanity to its precepts. Thus, 
as Leonard Levy notes, neither freedom of speech nor freedom of 
the press could “become a civil liberty until the truth of men’s 
opinions, especially their religious opinions, was regarded as relative 
rather than absolute.67 
 As an example of the effects of present truth on a citizen’s ability 
to speak freely about a topic, consider the tumultuous history of the 
heliocentric theory. Mario D’Addio notes that the Copernican 
theory, which held that the earth was neither still nor at the center of 
the universe, was officially condemned by the Catholic Church in 
1616 for being “contrary to Scripture.”68 At the same time, however, 
the work of Copernicus was “permitted because it provided 
particularly useful knowledge to society.”69 This is not unlike the 
situation Mill envisioned wherein the truth would be known but a 
conflicting view would be permitted because it was useful for 
sharpening our grasp on the truth.70 But freedom to speak about an 
idea that is officially declared false is hardly freedom, as Galileo was 
soon to learn.  
 In the wake of the Church’s decree, Galileo, who openly 
espoused Copernican theory, became embroiled in controversy. 
Initially, the Church seems only to have lightly encouraged Galileo 
to be obedient to the decision of the church and forego Copernican 
thought.71 But in this strange state of both condemnation and 
allowance, the heliocentric theory was bound to be brought to a 
more violent conflict with the “truth.” Nearly 15 years later, Galileo 
published his Dialogo, which included a “systematic analysis of the 
arguments which favored the heliocentric system”72 in such a manner 
that, at least to church officials, exhorted belief in them as true rather 
than just useful.73 This time Galileo was hauled before officials for a 
full-blown interrogation, which wrung from him a declaration that 
“the Ptolemaic thesis, and the Copernican, were equally valid,”74 or, 
 
 67. Marshall, supra note 1, at 22 (quoting LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF 
SUPPRESSION 6 (1960)). 
 68. MARIO D’ADDIO, THE GALILEO CASE: TRIAL/SCIENCE/TRUTH 67 (2004). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 71. D’ADDIO, supra note 68, at 68. 
 72. Id. at 90. 
 73. Id. at 141. 
 74. Id. at 139. 
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in other words, a declaration that heliocentrism was not truth. The 
interrogation was concluded by burning the Dialogo “before his 
face.”75  
In the nearly 400 years since, science has refuted the “truth” of 
geocentrism. And what freedom do those who still cling to 
geocentrism76 have to speak about it? Today, no one is prohibited 
from proclaiming his or her belief in it. But if authorities do not 
react to geocentrism as violently as did Galileo’s accusers, this may 
have more to do with a lack of equivalent faith in our own 
convictions, no matter how rational they appear to be.77 Perhaps the 
same misgivings that make us call scientific conclusions “theories” 
rather than “truths” underlie the reluctance to regulate the anti-
heliocentric ideas out of existence, and this modern skepticism may 
be a dam against potential metaphysical violence. But the 
marketplace posits that truths, not just theories, are possible, and 
presumably possible with the kind of reliability that comforted 
Galileo’s accusers. And today we see signs of the lack of freedom that 
comes when that possibility is realized, even if the process is less 
dramatic than Galileo’s. Certainly in the elementary school setting, 
for example, the geocentric concept is never introduced without a 
disclaimer as to its falsity. And if geocentrism is not true, and the 
reason we have a marketplace is to produce truth, why allow people 
 
 75. Id. at 140. 
 76. Gerardus D. Bouw, Why Geocentricity?, GEOCENTRICITY.COM, http:// 
www.geocentricity.com/geocentricity/whygeo.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2011). Dr. Bouw 
has a Ph.D. in astronomy. Gerardus D. Bouw, Testimony of Gerardus Dingeman Bouw, 
GEOCENTRICITY.COM, http://www.geocentricity.com/bibastron/bouw_bio.html (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2011). 
 77. As Justice Holmes noted in his Abrams dissent,  
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have 
no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your 
heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To 
allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as 
when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole-
heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises.  
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Though it may be 
tempting to think that geocentrism is “impotent,” the geocentric claim is a different kind of 
unbelievable than the squared circle. A squared circle is simply nonsensical—if you proved you 
had squared the circle you would in effect mean that you had formed a circle into a square. In 
this sense, the claim is impotent because there is simply nothing about it that can be believed, 
other than that circles, when toyed with, can turn into squares. The geocentric model of the 
universe, on the other hand, has the support of Ph.Ds. See supra note 76. 
DO NOT DELETE 10/15/2011 2:17 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1312 
to speak about geocentrism, especially in situations where no one is 
present to disabuse a naïve hearer? Why risk belief in an idea we all 
know is false?78 It follows that a society that is willing to accept the 
ends-based market as the justification for free speech must be equally 
willing to turn off the market, and thus free speech, when it is done 
working. Thus when the moment of truth comes, the era of freedom 
ends.  
3. Market-concept violence: truth as the end of free speech generally 
The theoretical lengths to which a government can go once it 
decides that free speech as a concept is “not true” are explored in 
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World.79 In his book, Huxley imagines a 
world where civic freedoms have been stripped away from the 
citizenry because, after a series of apocalyptic wars, there is general 
agreement that freedom leads to unhappiness.80 Social stability, held 
out as truth, has replaced freedom. Citizens’ speech about this truth 
is literally a regurgitation of government-approved ideas, which are 
whispered to babies as they sleep through a process called 
hypnopaedia.81 Each phrase represents an idea that contributes to 
social stability. This conditioning goes on “[t]ill at last the child’s 
mind is these suggestions, and the sum of the suggestions is the 
child’s mind . . . . The mind that judges and desires and decides- 
made up of these suggestions. But all these suggestions are our 
suggestions! . . . Suggestions from the State.”82 These suggestions 
were the products of a marketplace that yielded present truth—a 
truth that prized happiness and social stability over individual 
 
 78. Other than, perhaps, to keep us on our toes about the truth, as Mill proposed. But, 
as has been noted, while using false speech as a foil may be a justification for keeping the 
speech around, keeping it around as long as it is labeled “false” is not the same thing as letting 
citizens speak freely about it. See supra note 58. 
 79. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD & BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED 25–44 
(HarperCollins, 1965) (1932). 
 80. Id. at 31–44. 
 81. Id. at 17. Among the phrases whispered are the following: “Oh no, I don’t want to 
play with Delta Children. And Epsilons are still worse. They’re too stupid to be able to read or 
write. Besides they wear black, which is such a beastly colour. I’m so glad I’m a Beta,” id. at 
19; “[T]he more stitches the less riches” (to encourage consumption of new goods rather than 
prolonging the life of old ones), id. at 37; “[W]hen the individual feels, the community reels” 
(to discourage emotional reactions, which lead to social instability), id. at 72; “Everybody’s 
happy nowadays.” Id. at 70. 
 82. Id. at 20. 
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freedom after the devastation of war. In explaining the society’s 
progress from free speech to its current state, a head government 
official remarks, “Sleep teaching was [once] actually prohibited in 
England. There was something called liberalism. Parliament, if you 
know what that was, passed a law against it. The records survive. 
Speeches about liberty of the subject. Liberty to be inefficient and 
miserable. Freedom to be a round peg in a square hole.”83 That 
freedom, which included the freedom to be wrong and unhappy, was 
a necessary casualty of “truth.” To ensure the dominance of social 
stability as the ultimate truth, the government adopted a regulatory 
scheme that forced the utterance of it. 
Hyperbolic as this fictional account may be, it is nonetheless 
theoretically possible under current marketplace theory. Holmes 
accepts the proposition that “if the publication of [socialist 
propaganda] had been laid as an attempt to induce an uprising 
against the government at once and not at some indefinite time in 
the future it would have presented a different question. The object 
would have one with which the law might deal.”84 Thus, violent, 
immediate overthrow of the government, fostered by speech, was 
something that could be regulated, presumably because if the market 
is not open for business long enough, there will not be sufficient 
time to vet an idea. But “[i]f in the long run the beliefs expressed in 
proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant 
forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they 
should be given their chance and have their way.” These false 
distinctions, or, at least, distinctions impossible of identification 
(how long is the long run? where is the line between speech and 
action?) do little to alleviate the problem.85 No matter how slowly it 
might happen, the truth that emerges would still be a willful 
forgetting of the principle of deferral, which could be as extreme in 
its violence against freedom as the truth that emerged in Brave New 
World.  
 
 83. Id. at 34. 
 84. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 85. Fish, supra note 6, at 1076 (asking why “the very same event—the triumph of 
dictatorship—[should] be alternately feared or welcomed, depending on whether it has been 
brought about by force or by the force (somehow regarded as the antithesis of force) of 
speech”). 
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It is possible, of course, that at least for Holmes, an extreme 
“indifference . . . to outcomes” is in fact just a cocky confidence that 
proletarian revolution was not a serious possibility. Vincent Blasi 
notes that Holmes believed passionately in fallibilism, and “reserved 
his strongest ire for persons and philosophies that were not capable 
of adaption or reassessment: ‘When you know that you know 
persecution comes easy.’”86 Given that, it is hard to imagine that 
Holmes would support a theory of free speech that could actually 
lead to the end of adaption and reassessment, unless he did not 
actually believe that this outcome was possible. But whatever 
Holmes’s private intentions, other scholars have noted that the 
marketplace of ideas has no inherent self-protections.87 And even if 
Holmes did not, other scholars have believed that the danger of 
allowing speech that threatens the future of the market was real 
enough to write against it.88 A few decades ago, Judge Bork 
criticized the position that government cannot regulate “[s]peech 
advocating forcible overthrow of the government.”89 Such speech, he 
suggests, “breaks the premises of our system concerning ways in 
which truth is defined, and yet those premises are the only reasons 
for protecting political speech.”90 The only truth that Bork 
recognizes is a contextual one: “Truth is what the majority thinks it 
is at any given moment precisely because the majority is permitted to 
govern and to redefine its values constantly.”91 But take away that 
system, and whatever truth the market was supposed to discover no 
longer has any relevance.  
In light of the problems with present and future truth, it is clear 
that neither option would provide a satisfactory framework for the 
marketplace theory on its own. Neither, however, can the tension be 
ignored. It follows that some different approach is required to 
address the problem. 
 
 86. Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 20 
(2004) (quoting Letter from Holmes to Pollock, Aug. 30, 1929, in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK 
LETTERS 253 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941)). 
 87. E.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J.  1 (1971); see also sources cited supra note 11.  
 88. See Bork, supra note 87, at 29–31. 
 89. Id. at 31. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 30. 
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IV. DERRIDA 
In 1992, Jacques Derrida, the ostensible (and sometimes 
unwilling) father of Deconstruction, delivered an address at Cardozo 
Law School entitled Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of 
Authority.”92 Though his topic was not free speech, this Part argues 
that his discussion of the relationship between law and justice, after 
some translation, provides the basis for a workable means-based 
approach to free speech.  
For Derrida, law is indistinguishable from the power that makes 
it enforceable, or its force. 
The word ‘enforceability’ reminds us that there is no such thing as 
law (droit) that doesn’t imply in itself, a priori, in the analytic 
structure of its concept, the possibility of being ‘enforced,’ applied 
by force. There are, to be sure, laws that are not enforced, but 
there is no law without enforceability.93 
This equation of what is supposedly legitimate (law), with what is 
categorically illegitimate (violence) spotlights a tension for Derrida. 
He asks, “How are we to distinguish between this force of the 
law . . . and the violence one always deems to be unjust?”94 Using 
the German word gewalt as a platform, which he translates as 
denoting “both violence and legitimate power, justified authority,”95 
he posits that there is in fact no difference. Though laws look to a 
moment in history for their legitimacy (i.e. the inception of a 
constitution, or even natural law), such authorizing moments are 
inscribed in history by “originary violence that must have established 
this authority and that could not itself have been authorized by any 
anterior legitimacy.”96 Thus, “since the origin of authority, the 
foundation or ground, the position of the law can’t by definition rest 
on anything but themselves, they are themselves violence without a 
ground.”97 This is true even if the “originary violence” (say, the 
American Revolution) relies on some earlier “convention” (say, 
natural law) to authorize itself—one still smacks into the “‘mystical’ 
 
 92. Derrida, supra note 13. 
 93. Id. at 6. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 14. 
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limit” of authority, or moment in time when such conventions used 
unauthorized violence to authorize themselves.98 Appreciating this 
untethered nature of law, one sees the way in which it is “essentially 
deconstructible, whether because it is founded, constructed on 
interpretable and transformable textual strata . . . or because its 
ultimate foundation is by definition unfounded.”99 
Presumably, this recognition is ominous for a stable concept of 
justice, for just laws, and even for political involvement in the 
lawmaking process generally. And certainly some have taken the 
same position, equating deconstruction with political irresponsibility, 
in the spirit of Ivan Karamazov’s “all is lawful.”100 Jurgen Habermas 
saw the deconstructionist contribution as mere “revelations of a 
decentered subjectivity, emancipated from the imperatives of work 
and usefulness.”101 Derrida, however, far from advocating an 
abdication of political action, suggests tireless dedication to the 
“classical emancipatory idea.”102 But how, knowing the “essentially 
deconstructible” structure of the law, does one continue to 
champion it? In other words, is there a possibility of justice behind 
the violence of the law? 
Derrida begins his explication of justice with a paradoxical string 
of assertions: “Justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or 
beyond law, is not deconstructible. No more than deconstruction 
itself, if such a thing exists. Deconstruction is justice.”103 Right away 
it will become apparent that Derrida is referencing something 
“outside the text,” something fixed and transcendent, the possibility 
of which he repeatedly denies in the body of his work.104 This 
impossibility is not a problem, however. “[D]econstruction takes 
place in the interval that separates the undeconstructability of justice 
from the deconstructability of [law] (authority, legitimacy and so 
 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. 
 100. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 244 (Barnes & Noble Classics 
2004) (1879). 
 101. Thomas, supra note 6, at 525 (quoting Jurgen Habermas, Modernity—An 
Incomplete Project, in THE ANTI-AESTHETIC: ESSAYS ON POST-MODERN CULTURE 9, 14 (Hal 
Foster ed., 1983)). 
 102. Derrida, supra note 13, at 28. 
 103. Id. at 14–15 (emphasis added). 
 104. E.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 163 (Gayatri Spivak trans., Johns 
Hopkins Press corrected ed. 1997).  
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on). It is possible as an experience of the impossible, there where, 
even if it does not exist . . . there is justice.”105 Because it is situated 
in an impossible moment, outside of history, no one can claim to lay 
hold on justice. If one could, the relationship between 
deconstruction and justice would crumble and deconstruction would 
cease to operate in the face of an uncontestable truth, with an 
attendant failure to keep its only promise: deconstruction of 
everything that pretends to be justice. But despite its impossibility, 
we still maintain a responsibility towards justice. 
Derrida sees that responsibility as a “double-movement,” calling 
for two simultaneous attitudes towards justice.106 The first is 
“constantly to maintain an interrogation of the origin, grounds and 
limits of our conceptual, theoretical or normative apparatus 
surrounding justice” because that is where the violence hides.107  
Despite the hostility towards justice this interrogation would 
presumably tender, Derrida claims such investigation is  
anything but a neutralization [or an] . . . insensitivity toward 
justice. On the contrary, it hyperbolically raises the stakes of 
exacting justice; it is sensitivity to a sort of essential disproportion 
that must inscribe excess and inadequation in itself and strives to 
denounce not only theoretical limits but also concrete injustices, 
with the most palpable effects, in the good conscience that 
dogmatically stops before any inherited determination of justice.108  
Thus, the first movement requires an interrogation of the impossible 
moment of justice, in that we must question what is currently 
passing as justice, seeking to expose not only the limits of the 
concept, but also the injustices currently being worked in its name. 
In keeping with the title of Derrida’s theory, one engaged in this 
process cannot be said to be constructing justice, since one must 
“stop short” of any such thing. Rather one is engaged in 
deconstructing not-justice.  
This responsibility to interrogate and deconstruct is 
supplemented by the responsibility to do so in pursuit of justice. 
 
 105. Derrida, supra note 13, at 15. 
 106. Id. at 19. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id.  
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Attendant in this process will be a moment of anxiety in which the 
“old justice” is suspended in the name of the new: 
[I]n the moment that an axiom’s credibility . . . is suspended by 
deconstruction . . . one can always believe that there is no more 
room for justice, neither for justice itself nor for theoretical interest 
directed toward the problems of justice. This moment of 
suspense . . . without which, in fact, deconstruction is not possible, 
is always full of anxiety . . . . And this anxiety-ridden moment of 
suspense . . . cannot be motivated . . . except in the demand for an 
increase in or supplement to justice . . . . For in the end, where will 
deconstruction find its force, its movement or its motivation if not 
in this always unsatisfied appeal, beyond the given determinations 
of what we call, in determined contexts, justice, the possibility of 
justice?109 
So the anxiety inherent in attacking the grounds of what is “just” 
must be understood as the longing for more justice. More succinctly, 
justice is not in the result but the pursuit. Conceptualized (or co-
opted) this way, Derrida’s thinking begins to work out some of the 
problems with the ends-based marketplace.  
Translated into First Amendment terms, Derrida’s theory might 
progress in the following manner: (1) A speech regulation is always 
on unstable ground, in that it is “authorized” by unauthorized 
violence,110 (2) it follows that a law protecting speech is not presently 
“just,” despite such a law’s hallowed place in liberal societies,111 (3) 
 
 109. Id. at 20. 
 110. The First Amendment itself seems to have sprung from an unauthorized, and thus 
violent, act. Frederick Gedicks notes, “The First Amendment followed the Revolutionary War 
and was drafted pursuant to an amendment process, provided by a constitutional convention, 
that exceeded its original mandate of refining the Articles of Confederation.” Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, RFRA and the Possibility of Justice, 56 MONT. L. REV. 95, 112 (1995). Additionally, 
lodged in the history of the amendment is a metaphysical violence against other ideas about 
free speech (those that were narrowly defeated by the majority) and a violence against the 
Other (the minorities that were excluded from the process). Id. (“One can also mention the 
very narrow popular base of support for the Free Exercise Clause in both the Congress that 
enacted the First Amendment and the state legislatures that ratified it—no woman nor any 
Native Americans, African-Americans, or other racial minorities served in these bodies, and 
hardly any religious minorities were present; rather, these bodies were composed almost 
exclusively of propertied, white, Protestant males.”). Of course, even with an authorizing 
mandate, complete unanimity of opinion in the legislators, and a diverse body (and this 
presents its own violent problems), the Amendment would still be a violence against the 
Other, privileging one idea over the other, with no stable justification. 
 111. See supra Part II. 
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this is not bad news, however—in fact it even provides an 
opportunity for more justice. To realize that possibility we must 
recognize our responsibility to interrogate the grounds for free 
speech, denouncing any concrete injustices worked by it along the 
way, in pursuit of the justice we have yet to grasp. This theory of 
course assumes a condition of freedom to pursue such 
interrogations, and thus would keep as its central, deconstructive 
principle that the citizenry must always be permitted to deconstruct 
what is held up as true, or just. It follows then that a law permitting 
free speech, without ever intending to privilege any particular speech 
(or reaching a Truth), would be a law permitting the pursuit of 
justice.  
V. WHAT A MEANS-BASED APPROACH CAN DO 
As discussed in Part II, the conflicting dictates of deferral and 
inevitable revelation result in a First Amendment schizophrenia— 
one that commands deferral while simultaneously encouraging 
action. Part III demonstrated that this pathology is not resolved by 
choosing either option as the focus for the market. Instead, what is 
needed is a framework that deals with the tension between the two 
premises head on, one that recognizes (rather than tries to forget) 
both the impossible moment of acquiring future truth and the 
violence of present truth. This Part will discuss how a Derridean 
means-based view of the First Amendment can address, if not 
reconcile, the confusion.  
A. The End of Ends, and Their Terrible Promises Avoided 
As will be readily obvious, infinite deferral of truth would be a 
foundational principle, not a flaw, in a means-based rationale. And 
the problems that accompany deferred truth—its failure to provide 
guidance in the present where it is needed, and its inevitable and 
forgetful slide into violence—are mitigated by that shift in 
perspective.  
Infinite deferral of decisions, however, would be unnecessary in a 
Derridean ends-based approach,112 despite the recognition that 
 
 112. Not to mention that an admission that the ideas market will not yield satisfactory or 
just conclusions will make for, if nothing else, a more semantically honest description of the 
marketplace.  
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justice is always “a venir, always to come.”113 In fact, such waiting is 
unacceptable. This is so because, “left to itself, the incalculable . . . 
idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst for it 
can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation.”114 In 
other words, while the government waits, the people suffer.115 Thus 
“a just decision is always required immediately. It cannot furnish 
itself with infinite information and the unlimited knowledge of 
conditions, rules or hypothetical imperatives that could justify it.”116 
Instead, though justice exceeds calculation, it must be calculated.117 
It follows then that the government should not look for cues from 
the market on what sort of speech regulations to promulgate in the 
hope of establishing a pretense of authority. Instead, government 
must knowingly slide into the violence of present truth. At that 
moment, the means-based approach begins to do its work. Rather 
than the possibility of present truth foreclosing other truths, and in 
effect shutting down the market either topically or conceptually, a 
deconstructive view of the process would see such violence 
(injustice) as the beginning of the conversation rather than the end. 
The injustice of the present violence would be recognized rather 
than forgotten, deconstructible rather than absolute. Citizens would 
not only be free to engage in deconstruction but would also be 
responsible for doing so, denouncing the concrete injustices the 
violence has worked—but always in “the good conscience that 
dogmatically stops before any inherited determination of justice.”118 
In this way, government is authorized to be violently final, and be 
 
 113. Derrida, supra note 13, at 27.  
 114. Id. at 28.  
 115. Consider, as an uncontroversial example, the rhetoric of the Final Solution. The 
choice to stay out of the business of calculating justice, or just laws, is usually an abdication of 
that right to the forces of oppression. This sentiment is popularly captured in the familiar 
quote, some variant of which reads, “All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is for good 
men to do nothing” (often attributed to Burke, though there is no source supporting the 
attribution). Of course, the rather problematic underside of this thinking is that one must 
assume some sort of privileged access to justice (i.e., good men) in the citizens to which the 
call to calculate is extended—else how is one to know which of the calculations is the right 
one? The (somewhat maddening) Derridean answer is that one does not know, and this is 
exactly the point. Any attempt to calculate justice must, simultaneous with its calculation, also 
be an interrogation of the grounds of such calculation—grounds that of course are inherently 
deconstructible. 
 116. Derrida, supra note 13, at 26. 
 117. Id. at 28. 
 118. Id. at 20. 
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cognizant of its violence as a means of reaching towards justice—
bringing deferral to an end.  
As disquieting as this line of thinking may be, it should actually 
be familiar to students of the law. It is summed up rather simply in 
Justice Jackson’s oft quoted formulation of the Supreme Court’s 
authority: “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are 
infallible only because we are final,”119 which could just as easily read, 
“We are not final because we are just, we are just because we are 
final.” In the same spirit, we call the highest judge of a court system 
a justice, as though to equate the one with the other by making 
them indistinguishable. One may also be reminded, reflecting on this 
strange logic, of the apparently unauthorized actions of the 
Constitutional Congress in creating a Bill of Rights, or of Congress’s 
end run around the political process surrounding the 14th 
Amendment.120 Such metaphysical violence, or privileging of one 
idea over another without any stable authorization for doing so, is 
inherent in the founding and legislating of all nations (and is often 
inscribed in history only after some physical violence has occurred). 
The government simply must be final, though justice is never final or 
finished.  
In the face of such reasoning, the problems with present truth 
discussed in Part III are less troubling. The government can act now 
to make substantive decisions about speech. Because the 
deconstructive approach assumes the illegitimacy of such regulation, 
the falsity or unauthorized character of each such decision would be 
immediate and indisputable (as it would be after any length of 
market deliberation). What would save those decisions from being 
unjust would be the responsibility participants in the marketplace 
would have to deconstruct the decisions—show their injustice—in 
the spirit of a longing for more justice. The means of the 
marketplace, and not the ends of regulation, would thus hold out 
the possibility of justice. 
But it remains to address the fear that such government violence 
could result in the end of free speech conceptually. Free speech 
represents an idea itself, one presumably thrust upon nations by 
violence in an identical process to the one advocated here. Thus, the 
 
 119. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 120. Gedicks, supra note 110, at 106–07, 112; see also supra text accompanying note 
110. 
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argument goes, to be just, the market must allow attacks upon itself. 
The problem, however, is that in order to fulfill our responsibility 
towards justice, we must have a market that allows us to speak freely 
about the injustice of what is supposedly just. As soon as these 
irreconcilable demands come to the forefront, we experience a 
moment of anxiety (as predicted by Derrida).121 If the justice of free 
speech is attacked and defeated, how can the work of deconstruction 
proceed?  
The (somewhat unsatisfactory)122 answer to the dilemma is one 
of history. At the moment the market is founded, it is done so in the 
spirit of justice, or of deconstructing (not constructing) justice. It is 
not subject to the deconstructive justice of the market; free speech 
comes before the marketplace. Free speech could even be said to 
have no place in history at all, to be completely disconnected from, 
and thus untouched by, the demands of context and subjectivity. 
Free speech could be seen as justice itself, because it facilitates, or is, 
the deconstruction of injustice. In other words, free speech is 
deconstruction, and thus, not deconstructible. (This glaring aporia in 
a philosophical system that recognizes nothing that is “outside the 
text”123 would be not only acknowledged but embraced by 
Derrida.124) Thus, free speech is not “protectable” because its 
 
 121. Derrida, supra note 13, at 20 (noting that the “moment of suspense” that occurs 
when “an axiom’s credibility” is called into question “is always full of anxiety”). 
 122. If the following paragraph is unsatisfying, there is nothing unusual in it. Derrida is 
often accused of charlatanism, of obscuring and confusing things shamelessly so that when he 
reveals his “solutions” he appears intelligent. See Noam Chomsky, Chomsky on Post-Modernism, 
LBBS, available at http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/chomsky-on-postmodernism.html. In 
his defense, one might suggest that if he followed a line of thinking that led to an unbearable 
conclusion, one can hardly fault him for wanting to turn around, eventually. Derrida himself, 
for what it is worth, makes no claim to being able to satisfy, noting in response to the title of 
the symposium at which he delivered his address, Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 
that he “can offer no response, at least no reassuring response” to straightforward, yes-or-no 
questions about whether justice is actually possible. Derrida, supra note 13, at 4. 
 123.  DERRIDA, supra note 104, at 163. 
 124. “We can already see from this . . . aporia that the deconstruction of all presumption 
of a determinant certitude of a present justice itself operates on an infinite ‘idea of justice,’ 
infinite because it is irreducible . . . before any contract . . . . And so we can recognize in it . . . 
a madness. . . . And deconstruction is mad about this kind of justice. Mad about this desire for 
justice. This kind of justice, which isn’t law, is the very movement of deconstruction at work in 
law and the history of law, in political history and history itself, before it ever presents itself as 
the discourse that the academy or modern culture labels ‘deconstructionism.’” Derrida, supra 
note 13, at 25.  
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overthrow would “break the premises of our system,”125 as Bork 
argued, since the premises of our system are no more authorized 
than any other premises but instead are prior to all premises. 
This is not to say that the various iterations of free speech in 
modern liberal societies are not subject to full-throttle deconstructive 
attacks. But these attacks must always be launched in the spirit of 
rectification, not annihilation. In this manner, the dilemma caused 
by the apparently suicidal nature126 of the market is resolved. Instead 
of swallowing itself, the marketplace can only be attacked as a means 
of seeking a more just version of itself, a closer parallel between it 
and justice. Thus, the prospect of the legal annihilation of free 
speech by free speech, as contemplated by Justice Holmes,127 can be 
avoided by regulation without fear of injustice.  
Finally, a means-based theory can also quell anxiety about the 
violence truth would work against any speech topic (topical 
violence). As discussed in Part III, a necessary corollary to the truth-
based approach is that once the truth is revealed about a given topic, 
the market is done. In this way, an ends-based approach to free 
speech always carries with it the seeds of a time of unfree speech, 
especially since the temptation to cut short the deferral of decision 
making in the name of a truth presently discovered is always strong. 
But if, as in the means-based approach, the regulation of speech 
always carries with it the mark of its own madness (its unauthorized 
nature), then it is always subject to deconstruction, something to 
which a truth-based regulation would be impervious. Thus Galileo’s 
Dialogo would fare much better in a Derridean world, where 
Copernicus might be proclaimed officially untrue, but always with 
the knowledge that such proclamations were founded on completely 
deconstructible notions of truth.  
B. Market Failures and Deconstruction 
The recognition that the ideas marketplace serves as means rather 
than an end still does not adequately deal with another prevalent 
criticism of ends-based rationales: that the market cannot work 
because of certain, undeniable market failures.128 While these 
 
 125. Bork, supra note 87, at 31. 
 126. See supra Part III.B. 
 127. See supra text accompanying notes 64–66. 
 128. See, e.g., Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. 
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arguments are usually levied in favor of corrections that will lead to 
better ends rather than better means,129 they are still persuasive in the 
context of a means-based approach.  
One market-failure attack suggests that inherent flaws in the 
ideas marketplace distort its power to produce “truth.” In other 
words, no matter how long we defer, the market can never produce 
truth because it is, in its current shape, incapable of facilitating the 
proper dialogue. Among the problems cited are that “unorganized 
and perhaps unorganizable speakers are unable to compete with the 
wealthy corporations and organized interest groups that have access 
to sophisticated public relations tools and communications 
technologies.”130 Because of this “there is no basis for believing 
that . . . relevant information is produced, consumed, and then 
assimilated into a democratic decisionmaking.”131 Additionally, the 
market, by assuming the likelihood of rational discourse between free 
thinking members of society,  
ignores a host of factors that make us human, including altruism, 
habit, bigotry, panic, genius, luck or its absence, and factors such as 
peer pressures, institutions, and cultures that turn us into social 
animals. A dehumanized, desocialized, and often sexist ‘economic 
man’ [or ‘speech man’] supposedly goes through life as if it were 
one long series of analogies to isolated transactions on the New 
York Stock Exchange.132  
If the market worked, “we would expect demonstrably false ideas 
(e.g., the racism reflected in R.A.V.) to have lost influence over time. 
Instead, we see an ebb and flow in the influence of such ideas, a 
cycling that appears to respond to political and socioeconomic 
events.”133 From this prospective, “the phenomenon of persistent 
factual falsity should be an occasion for pause or embarrassment to 
 
L. REV. 951, 965 (1997); Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 897, 898 (2010). 
 129. E.g., Schauer, supra note 128, at 898 (lamenting the inability of the market to 
eliminate “demonstrable falsity” and suggesting methods of improvement to that end). 
 130. Brietzke, supra note 128, at 965.  
 131. Id. at 958.  
 132. Id. at 962 (quoting Paul Brietzke, Urban Development and Human Development, 25 
IND. L. REV. 741, 753 (1978)). 
 133. Brietzke, supra note 128, at 959 (referencing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377 (1992)). 
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the free speech tradition.”134 Thus, critics propose a solution to the 
dilemma—market correction in the form of government 
intervention.135  
Frederick Schauer proposes that government get involved in 
combating the persistence of factually false speech by working in the 
market in ways that do not implicate the First Amendment.136 
Noting recent Court decisions establishing the breadth of the 
government speech doctrine, Schauer suggests that market failings 
that have led to the persistence of false ideas, e.g., “that President 
Obama was born in Kenya and not in Hawaii, that President Bush 
had advance warning of the September 11 attacks, that AIDS is the 
product of a government conspiracy, that the prophesies of astrology 
are reliable, and that the Holocaust did not occur,”137 could be 
corrected by the government through the government’s advocating 
countering ideas on its own behalf.138 Brietzke suggests that “the 
Supreme Court should open up private and public channels of 
communication, through modest attempts to equalize access to ideas 
markets.”139 This would allow us to pursue the legitimate goal of 
“restrain[ing] the autonomy of those who would utter virulently 
racist speech, to benefit people who are rendered ‘less autonomous’ 
by hatred and discrimination in the wider society.”140 As a matter of 
theory, such adjustments to the market would supplement its 
effectiveness, but its essential function would remain the same: the 
elimination of demonstrably false ideas, and by implication, the 
clarification of truth.  
The market-failure attack also loses some potency when the 
market is stripped of its ends-based justification. The premise of the 
attack, that what truth the market reveals (i.e. that racism is not 
demonstrably false) is distorted by market inequities, becomes 
irrelevant if the goal of the market is not to render any permanent 
conclusions at all. In a means-based system, the government would 
not be looking for cues from the market as to what regulations to 
 
 134. Schauer, supra note 128, at 898.  
 135. Id. at 917–18; Brietzke, supra note 128, at 966, 968.  
 136. Schauer, supra note 128, at 917–18.  
 137. Id. at 897 (citations omitted). 
 138. Id. at 918. 
 139. Brietzke, supra note 128, at 966. 
 140. Id. at 968 (citing CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 61 (1996)). 
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promulgate, at least not explicitly. Instead, speakers would be free to 
express dissatisfaction with the justification for regulation, and to 
attempt to discredit it, in the hopes of deconstructing the “concrete 
injustices” being worked by it. Granted, such a conception of the 
market would require at a minimum a guarantee of equal access to 
the opportunity to deconstruct if citizens are to fulfill their 
responsibility to justice. Thus, if the market is a forum for fulfilling 
responsibility, and that responsibility cannot be fulfilled in the silence 
of one’s conscience,141 then the baseline must assume not only the 
freedom to speak one’s deconstructive contentions but also the right 
to have them heard.142 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The schizophrenia and amnesia that characterizes the current 
state of the marketplace of ideas theory is undoubtedly in need of 
diagnosis and prescription. Deferred truth and inevitable revelation 
simply cannot be swallowed at the same time, or at least not without 
a fair amount of violent side effects. And on their own they do 
nothing to alleviate the marketplace’s disorders. Though the means-
based approach to free speech advocated in this Comment may be an 
incomplete solution for that pathology, it is offered as a possible 









 141. Derrida, supra note 13, at 22 (“That justice exceeds law and calculation . . . cannot 
and should not serve as an alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles . . . .”). 
 142. Delineating the parameters of how the deconstructive process would take place in 
the concrete world—how important persuasion of others is in the process, and what access to 
ensure to the means of persuasion, who needs to hear, how many need to hear, the medium 
for the process, etc.,—is beyond the scope of this Comment. But in this sense, Brietzke and 
Schauer’s proposed market corrections may provide useful starting points. See Brietzke, supra 
note 128; Schauer, supra note 128. 
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